Limit pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests

Article Abstract:

A case wherein two incumbents disagree about the desirability of entry is investigated. Analysis shows that the separating equilibrium is non-distortionary since it requires prices to remain the same as if there was no potential entry. Moreover, it is shown that the separating equilibria will exist only if the gain from deterring or provoking entry is not too large for at least one of the firms, relative to the cost of deviating to the Nash-equilibrium price of the other state.

Competition (Economics), Barriers to entry (Industrial organization), Barriers to entry, Equilibrium (Economics)

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Fashion and sales

Article Abstract:

Research is presented concerning the predictable clearance sales techniques of shopkeepers. The mechanism used by monopolists to discriminate by price on an inter-temporal basis even when consumer behavior is predictable is discussed.

Prices, Management, Economic aspects, Retail stores, Fashion, Stores, Product differentiation, Special sales

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