Managerial reputation and the competitiveness of an industry

Article Abstract:

The distinction between ownership and management in a typical duopolistic or imperfectly competitive firm is discussed in relation to strategies adopted to increase competitiveness. It is shown that managers tend to produce more than the quantity required to maximize profit as a means of strengthening their reputation in the labor market which determines their future income. The result of this managerial action is a lower price equilibrium and increased competition in the industry.

Beliefs, opinions and attitudes, Executives

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Strategic forward contracting and observability

Article Abstract:

Strategic incentives, when hedging motives are present, may affect forward contracting in two-stage duopoly games even when forward positions are discernible. Rational competitors expect forward positions taken to evade risk connected with demand uncertainty. Though observability of forward contracts influence strategic behavior, hedging motives guarantee that such behavior does not cease to appear in the absence of observability.

Contract Administration, Contracts, Contract management

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