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Anticompetitive vertical integration by a dominant firm

Article Abstract:

Research was conducted to examine the hypothesis that backward vertical integration by a dominant firm into an upstream competitive industry leads to an increase in both input and output prices. The objective was to create a related theory of anticompetitive vertical integration that has a clearer policy message and a simpler structure. Results suggest that the dominant firm model generates an observable sufficient indicator of welfare-improving vertical mergers.

Author: Riordan, Michael H.
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1998
Acquisitions & Mergers Analysis, Models, Acquisitions and mergers, Financial analysis, Vertical integration

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Regulation and preemptive technology adoption

Article Abstract:

A case where two rival firms consider the adoption of a new technology is analyzed. These firms must weigh factors such as the timing of the adoption, knowledge of declining costs over time and the variation of profit flows with adoption patterns. Price and entry regulations can make slow adoption a better alternative than preemption choices. However, some firms get discouraged by these rules that they choose to increase the speed of technology adoption.

Author: Riordan, Michael H.
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1992
Management, Innovations, Business enterprises, Technology

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Regulating complementary products: a comparative institutional analysis

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted on optimal regulation in industries where production requires complementary inputs. Results showed that unbundling introduces into regulation an information cost component similar to double marginalization in the monopoly pricing of complementary products. Unbundling was found to beneficial when it enables ample competition in nonmonopoly services, although the information cost could surpass the benefits of competition.

Author: Gilbert, Richard J., Riordan, Michael H.
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1995
Competition (Economics), Production management, Industry self-regulation, Industry self regulation

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Subjects list: Research
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