Existence of adaptively stable sunspot equilibria near an indeterminate steady

Article Abstract:

The nonlinear model equation Markov stationary sunspot equilibria (SSEs) exist near an indeterminate steady state and earlier results have not provided conditions for the existence of adaptively stable SSEs near an indeterminate steady state. It is shown that Markov SSEs are locally stable under adaptive learning.

Models, Diophantine equations

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Informational robustness of competitive equilibria

Article Abstract:

The robustness of equilibria of the complete information economy with respect to incomplete information is investigated. Conditions are provided under which complete information equilibria are limits of equilibria of the economies with incomplete information.

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Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities

Article Abstract:

The games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary number of players and actions with a slight noise in payoff signals are studied. A unique strategy profile that is present in the game survives iterative dominance as the signal noise vanishes.

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