Folk Theorem For Bilateral Bargaining with Vector Endowments

Article Abstract:

A two-player bargaining game involving the division of vector endowment sums is analyzed, with the discounting of single period utilities and alternating proposals. A weakly Pareto-efficient agreement is derived and its conditions delineated.

Models, Economics, Game theory, Economic theory, Business negotiations

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Peer Pressure and Incentives

Article Abstract:

A limited liability and moral hazard multi-agent model is extended by the introduction of a peer pressure function. Optimal incentives are calculated under several conditions and their interrelationships are discussed.

Public affairs, Psychological aspects, Social aspects, Tests, problems and exercises, Influence, Peer pressure, Incentives (Business)

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The Delaying Effect of Financing Constraints on Investment

Article Abstract:

A model is derived for a firm considering different investment projects under financing constraints that limit the firm to one project at a time. The value of waiting is then calculated for various conditions.

Strategy & planning, Planning, Capital investments, Strategic planning (Business), Company business planning, Capital investment

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