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Incentive-efficient equilibria of two-party sealed-bid bargaining games

Article Abstract:

Two-party sealed-bid bargaining game equilibrium is affected by the incentive efficiency notions of the bidders whose gains depend on their private value. Based on the premise that both bidders are not negatively affected by offering bids, incentive efficient equilibrium in two-party sealed bid games can be attained by using a set of sufficient conditions which also provides for the rejection or acceptance of incentive efficiency of numerical solution-dependent equilibrium.

Author: Gresik, Thomas A.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1996
Research, Game theory

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Stationary Ramsey equilibria under uncertainty

Article Abstract:

An evaluation of the Ramsey theorem reveals that a stationary rational expectations equilibrium may exist in a stationary Nash equilibrium and in a stationary competitive equilibrium. The study evaluates Ramsey equilibria under uncertainty and results show that deterministic dynamic equilibrium models with borrowing constraints may be able to exhibit dynamic solutions under certain conditions.

Author: Zilcha, Itzhak, Becker, Robert
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1997
Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Private Households, Households, Evaluation, Economic aspects, Consumer spending, Ramsey numbers

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Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: Structure, selection, and computation

Article Abstract:

The study introduces an algorithm to compute a stationary equilibrium of an arbitrary finite n-person discounted stochastic game. The algorithm deals with the equilibrium selection problem in that it computes the stationary equilibrium selected by a natural extension of the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten.

Author: Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, Peeters, Ronald J.A.P.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
Stochastic analysis

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Subjects list: Models, Equilibrium (Economics)
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