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Stability of competitive equilibrium with respect to recursive and learning processes

Article Abstract:

The expectational stability of the Walrasian intertemporal equilibria is used to determine the degrees of stability of competitive equilibria for recursive and learning processes. This expectational stability, which provides an automatic adjustment between the current market prices and expected future prices, indicates stability of the processes involved. Although stability can be achieved with other finite and infinite least-square processes, such stability does not necessarily indicate expectational stability.

Author: Balasko, Yves, Royer, Daniel
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1996
Research, Usage, Walrasian model, Differential equations, Linear, Linear differential equations

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Investment timing and learning externalities

Article Abstract:

The study presents a duopoly model of investment, in which each player learns about the quality of a common value project by observing she impact of changes in the cost and signal distributions on investment timing, and how equilibrium is affeome public background information, and possibly the experience of his rival. It also determines tcted when a first-mover advantage is introduced.

Author: Mariotti, Thomas, Decamps, Jean-Paul
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
Analysis, Investments, Investment management

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Match choice and ghettoization in evolutionary games

Article Abstract:

A study is conducted to show how the question of who to play affects the evolution of strategies in a large population of agents playing a 2*2 common interest game. Match choice allows agents playing fragile but efficient strategies to isolate themselves, raising their returns but making it harder for outsiders to duplicate their success.

Author: Larson, Nathan
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
Matching theory

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Subjects list: Models, Equilibrium (Economics)
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