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Probabilistic voting, campaign contributions, and efficiency

Article Abstract:

The Brock-Magee-Young (BMY) models does not assume that political parties are concerned with the welfare of a particular group. Biases are the result of the democratic political process. The BMY approach supposes that the political parties are only interested in power and increasing the probability of being elected is their objective. The election probability would depend on the parties' policies and the available financial resources which would influence voters. Parties are found to be irrational and do not consider the contributions to other parties.

Author: Thomas, Jonathan, Clark, Derek
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1995
Elections, Political parties, Campaign funds, Voting

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Training duration and post-training outcomes: a duration-limited competing risks model

Article Abstract:

A training program's effectiveness is determined using a modified competing risk model on data from the Youth Training Scheme. It is suggested that trainees who completed the program's two-year term have better employment opportunities than those who completed the program's short-term training because of training continuity. The high motivation derived from the program's full-term duration applies to both trainees and trainers.

Author: Pudney, Stephen, Thomas, Jonathan, Mealli, Fabrizia
Publisher: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Publication Name: Economic Journal
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0013-0133
Year: 1996
Research, Models, Evaluation, Employment, Employee training, Youth Training Scheme

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What price coordination? The efficiency-enhancing effect of auctioning the right to play

Article Abstract:

A model is derived to analyze the results of a recent experiment where subjects repeatedly played a coordination game with the right to play auctioned each period in a larger group. It is shown that the auction had an efficiency-enhancing effect wherein subjects bid the market-clearing price to a level recoverable only in the efficient equilibrium and then converged to that equilibrium.

Author: Crawford, Vincent, Broseta, Bruno
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1998
Learning, Psychology of, Learning theory (Psychology)

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Subjects list: Analysis
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