Economy of specialization and diseconomy of externalities

Article Abstract:

Externality-corrective government policy indirectly affects institutional structure, division of labor and the boundary between internal and external effects of externalities. An agent may either integrate, move away or produce products similar to an agent that causes an externality to his production when an externality-corrective government policy is implemented. Such reactions by an agent result to a corresponding change in institutional structure, division of labor and the boundary that distinguishes internal and external effects of externalities.

Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Externalities (Economics), Welfare economics

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The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting

Article Abstract:

The ability to cooperate in the provision of public good in a repeated game has been examined. The results showed that the critical value of the discount parameter converges to zero in the limit when the level of provision is fixed with quasi-linear utility. The admissible values of the discount parameter such as cooperation may be maintained in the limit if the level cooperation is adjusted optimally as the group size increases, both for a specific form of quasi-linearity and for Cobb-Douglas utility.

Public goods, Game theory, Cooperation (Economics), Cooperation

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