Optimal regulation of MNEs and government revenues

Article Abstract:

The host country can optimally regulate multinational enterprises by imposing limitations on the latter's ownership of the enterprise and transfer pricing policies. It is assumed that the host government is interested in maximizing tax revenues to support economic growth. Thus, such restrictions are not considered unfair if only to prevent the domestic firm from experiencing falling profits and realizing the goal of increased revenue for the government.

Analysis, International business enterprises, Multinational corporations, Transfer pricing

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Complexity in Regulation

Article Abstract:

The behavior of bureaucracy is often governed by the complexity of regulation. A model is developed to trace the effects of complexity. The consumer must consider the comparison between the utility cost of using the goods produced by the bureaucracy or having someone else do it for him. Complexity tends to be socially excessive.

Bureaucracy

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Rules, Rule Intermediaries and the Complexity and Stability of Regulation

Article Abstract:

The costs of regulation must be considered to understand the regulatory process. Intermediaries must be considered as a function of lowering the social costs of regulation. Intermediaries are interested in the stability and complexity of the regulations.

Finance, Wholesale industry, Wholesale trade, Social desirability

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