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Proof of efficiencies in mergers and joint ventures

Article Abstract:

The efficiency analysis of mergers and joint ventures engaged in by antitrust enforcement agencies should include both a pre-merger assessment of efficiency and an assessment of efficiencies after-the-fact. Many claimed merger efficiencies are never actually realized, but enforcers are not in a position to predict with any certainty which horizontal integrations will yield consumer benefits. Parties to proposed mergers and joint ventures would be more realistic in their claims if they knew that they were subject to the continuing jurisdiction of antitrust agencies.

Author: Brodley, Joseph F.
Publisher: American Bar Association
Publication Name: Antitrust Law Journal
Subject: Law
ISSN: 0003-6056
Year: 1996
Joint ventures

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Antitrust, competitiveness, and the world arena: efficiencies and failing firms in perspective

Article Abstract:

Advocating competitiveness is important to national and international economic well-being, but efficiency justifications and the failing company defense should not be allowed to override sound antitrust analysis and enforcement. Calls for further relaxation of antitrust standards in the US are unjustified because US competition policy is more supportive of business that the schemes in most other nations. The failing company defense in mergers is an important means of protecting jobs and communities, but it does not need to be expanded.

Author: Fox, Eleanor M.
Publisher: American Bar Association
Publication Name: Antitrust Law Journal
Subject: Law
ISSN: 0003-6056
Year: 1996
Analysis, Comparative analysis, Business failures, International economic integration, Economic integration, international

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Merger efficiencies: reconsidering the "passing-on" requirement

Article Abstract:

The requirement that efficiencies related to a merger result in lower prices being "passed on" to consumers is inconsistent with sound economic analysis and should be eliminated. If the merged entity will have no market power, it cannot pass on efficiencies in the form of lower prices because it will keep prices at market levels. If it has market power and the capacity to lower prices, the relevant inquiry should focus on whether efficiency gains will exceed any anticompetitive effects related to increased market power.

Author: Vita, Michael G., Yde, Paul L.
Publisher: American Bar Association
Publication Name: Antitrust Law Journal
Subject: Law
ISSN: 0003-6056
Year: 1996
Market share

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Subjects list: United States, Economic aspects, Laws, regulations and rules, Acquisitions and mergers, Antitrust law
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