A comment of Aumann's Bayesian view

Article Abstract:

Aumann's Bayesian view, "the notion of equilibrium is an unavoidable consequence," is inaccurate. The information model can be interpreted either by the representation of the prior stage that actually occurred at some prior time or by the hierarchy representation. The second representation reveals that any group of infinite hierarchies of beliefs can lead to the information model. The hierarchy representation may be considered as true in claiming that the information model is commonly known to all the characters. However, this would cause the prior stage to become implausible to be treated experimentally.

Information Theory, Models, Information technology

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Efficiency and immediate agreement: a reply to Hart and Levy

Article Abstract:

The views expounded by Hart and Levy on the bargaining foundations of the Shapley value are correct. However, it is worthwhile to consider the existence of an assumption stronger than that strict super-additivity can yield efficiency. It is proven that strict super-additivity is enhanced by strict supermodularity, which implies that every meeting ends in agreement. As such, strict supermodularity can be used as an alternative to the procedure suggested by Hart and Levy.

Measurement, Industrial efficiency, Economic efficiency, Negotiation, Negotiations

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Asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asymmetric information

Article Abstract:

An efficient, incentive-compatible and individually rational allocation can be guaranteed upon replication of an exchange economy with asymmetric information given certain conditions. This result is obtainable regardless of whether aggregate uncertainty remains after replication or not. Application of the model to asymmetric information cases, such as Akerlof's lemons problem and the buyer's bid double action problem, is considered.

Economic aspects, Economics, Exchange, Resource allocation, Equilibrium (Economics), Information theory in economics

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