Recent Work on Moral Responsibility(*)

Article Abstract:

The relationship between moral responsibility and free will is emphasized in a survey of recent literature on moral responsibility. Topics include the concept of moral responsibility, including the Strawsonian approach, Marina Oshana's 'accountability' perspective, Gary Watson's 'two faces' of responsibility, and responsibility in relation to autonomy; alternative possibilities as a requirement for responsibility, including the consequence argument, the 'rollback' argument, and libertarian accounts; R. Jay Wallace's challenge to the alternative-possibilities requirement, Frankfurt-type cases, the assumption of causal determinism versus the assumption of indeterminism, and escapability of responsibility; actual-sequence accounts of moral responsibility, including identification approaches and reasons-responsiveness accounts; and semicompatibilism.

Beliefs, opinions and attitudes, Free will and determinism, Determinism, Free will, Responsibility

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Quinn on Double Effect: the problem of "closeness." (The Doctrine of Double Effect)(response to Warren S. Quinn, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 18, p. 334, 1989)

Article Abstract:

Warren Quinn has recently examined the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), which distinguishes between intentional harm and harm that is only foreseen. Quinn bases his discussion on the difference between direct and indirect agency, but this interpretation is implausible and does not capture the DDE's distinction between intentional and foreseen harms. Furthermore, the Kantian rationale proposed by Quinn deals with motivations that are irrelevant to the DDE. In short, Quinn's representation of the DDE is inaccurate.

Agent (Philosophy), Intention, Intention (Psychology)

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Punishment and desert: A reply to Dolinko

Article Abstract:

A reply to David Dolinko, who explores in his work "Some Thoughts about Retributivism", wherein he explores the thesis he calls "modest retributivism." is presented. The structure of the retributive view of the justification of punishment is evaluated, while agreeing with Dolinko that it does not follow from one's morally deserving to be in a certain condition that it would be permissible for someone else, or the state, to cause him to be in that condition.

Analysis, Criticism and interpretation, Works, Punishment, Punishment (Psychology), Some Thoughts about Retributivism (Book), Dolinko, David

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