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Efficiency and rational bargaining in contractual settings

Article Abstract:

Jules L. Coleman in 'Risks and Wrongs' attempts to improve the rationale for economic analysis of law through the introduction of rational bargaining theory, but does not add much to conventional economic analysis. Coleman fails to differentiate homogeneous and heterogeneous transactions. For laws regulating homogeneous transactions, problems addressed by rational bargaining theory do not arise. In heterogeneous transactions, different classes of buyers and sellers need to be accounted for, which rational bargaining theory cannot do because of its focus on single transactions.

Author: Craswell, Richard
Publisher: Harvard Society for Law and Public Policy, Inc.
Publication Name: Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
Subject: Political science
ISSN: 0193-4872
Year: 1992
Economic aspects, Contracts

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Rational choice and the law

Article Abstract:

Jules L. Coleman in 'Risks and Wrongs' attempts to follow a Hobbesian theory of political justification based on rationality alone, but he ends up with a more Kantian practice by appealing to moral norms. In particular, Coleman introduces moral considerations with the concept of the hypothetical ideal contract, a Kantian device which effectively combines reason and morality. Coleman's need to resort to morality illustrates the inadequacy of rational choice as a basis for justification. However, Coleman's theory would be enhanced by a more explicit treatment of morality.

Author: Hampton, Jean
Publisher: Harvard Society for Law and Public Policy, Inc.
Publication Name: Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
Subject: Political science
ISSN: 0193-4872
Year: 1992
Ethical aspects, Rational expectations (Economics)

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Tort law as a comparative institution: reply to Perry

Article Abstract:

Stephen R. Perry's suggestion to incorporate a fault requirement into Jules L. Coleman's conception of corrective justice should be resisted. Fault is a feature of criminal law which should not be applied to tort liability. The inapplicability of fault is demonstrated by necessity cases, which give rise to a duty to compensate although there is no fault. However, Perry is correct to highlight the comparative nature of tort law. Comparative inquiry is needed in tort to allocate already-incurred losses among the parties involved.

Author: Finkelstein, Claire
Publisher: Harvard Society for Law and Public Policy, Inc.
Publication Name: Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
Subject: Political science
ISSN: 0193-4872
Year: 1992
Beliefs, opinions and attitudes, Torts, Perry, Stephen R.

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Subjects list: Criticism and interpretation, Risks and Wrongs (Book), Coleman, Jules L.
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