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Rent control and complete contract equilibria

Article Abstract:

A theoretical framework for examining the effects of rent control was proposed. The model incorporates the responses of individual agents to rent control as well as the roles of optimal long-term contractual arrangements to determine the economic properties of a rent-controlled housing market. Empirical results showed that the model can explain observed characteristics of a controlled market equilibrium. It was also found that rent control does not necessarily affect the development of new rental housing or cause a redistribution of wealth from landlords to tenants of controlled units.

Author: Skelley, Chris
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Regional Science & Urban Economics
Subject: Social sciences
ISSN: 0166-0462
Year: 1998

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Landlords, tenants and the public sector in a spatial equilibrium model of rent control

Article Abstract:

The effects of rent control in an urban setting were investigated. A spatial equilibrium model of partial rent control was developed to examine rent control policy effects in controlled and uncontrolled environments when landlords and tenants change economic and location decisions. Empirical results showed that tenants may find it rational to favor rent control even after accounting for long-run adjustments in land and housing markets. Furthermore, tenants in both controlled and uncontrolled zones may benefit from urban rent control.

Author: Heffley, Dennis
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Regional Science & Urban Economics
Subject: Social sciences
ISSN: 0166-0462
Year: 1998

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Rent control with reputation: theory and evidence

Article Abstract:

The effects of rent control were modeled in an environment in which the adoption of controls under certain conditions is expected by both investors and households. Rent-control policy was viewed as an implicit contract between suppliers of rental housing and voters of a community in New Jersey. Empirical results showed that community size affects the propensity to adopt rent control. A state-invariant price ceiling was found to be a self-reinforcing rent-control equilibrium.

Author: Epple, Dennis
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Regional Science & Urban Economics
Subject: Social sciences
ISSN: 0166-0462
Year: 1998

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Subjects list: Models, Housing policy, Landlord and tenant, Landlord-tenant relations, Rental housing, Rent control
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