Triangular or indirect deterrence/compellence: something new in deterrence theory?
Article Abstract:
The Israel-Arab-Soviet wherein the Soviet-issued nuclear threat against Israel and Iraq's scud attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War are used to explain the novel concept of triangular deterrence. Triangular or indirect deterrence occurs when a weaker state which lacks the capability to deter a stronger state chooses to threaten a small state that is either related or unrelated to the stronger state. Asymmetric strategies such as anti-US terrorism, destruction of US aircraft and pilots and passive defensive measures are classified under asymmetric strategies.
Publication Name: Comparative Strategy
Subject: International relations
ISSN: 0149-5933
Year: 1998
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Deterrence and defense in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment
Article Abstract:
The US can prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons by its ability to protect its forces and punish those who use such weapons. The US forces can be protected by early detection and identification biological and chemical weapons, the capability to conduct military operations in contaminated environments, and the capability to locate and destroy NBC weapons within and outside of US territories. Deterrence against NBC weapons include the demonstration of a capability to retaliate through the use of superior conventional forces.
Publication Name: Comparative Strategy
Subject: International relations
ISSN: 0149-5933
Year: 1996
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Strength in an unsettled world: the role of nuclear weapons in nuclear nonproliferation and deterrence
Article Abstract:
The US should include a nuclear deterrent strategy in its nonproliferation policy to discourage other nuclear states from using such weapons. The Persian Gulf War and the North Korean situation show the limitations of US conventional forces and economic and diplomatic leverage in neutralizing the nuclear capability of opposing states. While the US must have the option to use nuclear weapons as an additional deterrent, such use must be for defensive purposes and only as a last resort.
Publication Name: Comparative Strategy
Subject: International relations
ISSN: 0149-5933
Year: 1996
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