Deterrence and the fragility of rationality
Article Abstract:
A policy of nuclear deterrence is consistent with agent-rationalism as well as agent-moralism. That is, a rational agent is capable of forming and sustaining the conditional intention to retaliate, even while acknowledging that actually carrying out the threat would be irrational. Deterrent intentions can be viewed as rational and moral when it is recognized that rationality is fragile, that rational agents may succumb to emotions such as the desire for revenge if deterrence fails. Such an interpretation is attractive because it suggests that the threat of deterrence is serious, while preserving the agent's deliberative integrity and rationality.
Publication Name: Ethics
Subject: Philosophy and religion
ISSN: 0014-1704
Year: 1996
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Defending irrationality and lists
Article Abstract:
Actions that are rationally allowed can be distinguished from both rationally required and irrational actions. Rationally allowed actions do not necessarily require a reason. However, theories based on a dichotomy between the rational and the irrational tend to regard actions not based on reason as irrational. Any action in which the self is not harmed is rational. Rational actions do not share any general feature other than not being irrational, which is why a list-based definition of irrationality captures the ordinary usage of the concept of rationality better than any formal definition of rationality.
Publication Name: Ethics
Subject: Philosophy and religion
ISSN: 0014-1704
Year: 1993
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Immoral intentions
Article Abstract:
The argument that nuclear deterrence is immoral is based on the fact that it requires people to intend to do things that are morally wrong. The premise based on wrongful intentions is usually attacked, but it can be effectively reformulated to state that the intender is morally deficient. A more serious problem with the argument lies in the premise that a policy requiring people to so intend is necessarily immoral. This premise cannot be defended on consequentialist or deontological grounds.
Publication Name: Ethics
Subject: Philosophy and religion
ISSN: 0014-1704
Year: 1992
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