Interlocking directorates across listed companies in Italy: the case of banks

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the effects of interlocking directorates on the Italian banking industry reveals that the closest relationships are usually accompanied by the majority shareholdings and that these relationships have replaced ownership links in the presence of legislative restraints. Listed companies from 1985 to 1995 were gathered to ascertain how interlocking directorates serve to strengthen ownership relationships or replace them and results show that the former is true.

Research, Interlocking directorates

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Notes on firms, banks and company law

Article Abstract:

Banking institutions are managed well in lieu of corporate governance if banks take on the part of shareholders, creditors, participants in the financial market and vigilant owners. Banks are to balance their interests with the interests of the shareholders and the economy as a whole by making decisions based on sound economics. Regulatory procedures should also be taken into account and laws to consider include incorporation laws, civil procedures and monetary policies.

Management

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