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The relation between accounting goodwill numbers and equity values

Article Abstract:

The concept of purchased goodwill as regarded by national accountants in the US is examined in terms of its relation to equity values using data taken from the period 1982-1988. Goodwill is generally regarded as an asset and as such, is subject to systematic amortization. Results of the analysis of the data indicate that there is a significant variation in the relationship among different firms. There is, however, strong evidence that investors regard goodwill highly as an economic asset. On the other hand, the evidence that it is declining in value is weak.

Author: Robinson, John, Thompson, Robert B., II, Jennings, Ross, Duvall, Linda
Publisher: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Publication Name: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0306-686X
Year: 1996
Accounting and auditing, Goodwill (Business)

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Decentralization, management accounting system (MAS) information characteristics and their interaction effects on managerial performance: a Singapore study

Article Abstract:

An examination of the relationships between both of the control subsystems of management accounting system (MAS) and organizational structure and their interaction effects on managerial performance reveals that decentralization substantially moderates the sophistication level of each of the MAS information characteristics in ways that affect the performance of managers. The study used the responses of 48 Singapore managers to questionnaires designed to measure the variables.

Author: Yew Ming Chia
Publisher: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Publication Name: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0306-686X
Year: 1995
Research, Employee performance appraisals, Performance appraisals, Managerial accounting, Decentralization (Management)

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Ownership structure and managerial incentives: the evidence from acquisitions by dual class firms

Article Abstract:

Dual class managers with strong preference for control, make acquisitions that involve huge private benefits at the expense of outside shareholders. Their control of about half of the votes enable them to pursue self-serving interests protected from market discipline for corporate control, but harming outside shareholders. This occurs as high levels of ownership are not enough to align the interests of managers and outside shareholders.

Author: Song, Moon H., Hanson, Robert C.
Publisher: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Publication Name: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0306-686X
Year: 1996
Management, Economic policy, Executives, Dual-class common stock, Dual class common stocks

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