Abstracts - faqs.org

Abstracts

Environmental services industry

Search abstracts:
Abstracts » Environmental services industry

Pigouvian taxation under double moral hazard

Article Abstract:

A study on deriving optimum pollution taxes under conditions where production is carried out under vertical contractual agreements that are characterized by conditions of double moral standard is presented. Imposing a Pigouvian tax equal to the marginal cost of pollution on either the upstream or the downstream agent or in the industry, as a whole does not lead to the first best level of pollution. On the contrary, the industry should pay for less than the full cost of environmental pollution. Also under the conditions of double moral hazard both agents should be taxed.

Author: Lichtenberg, Erik, Aggarwal, Rimjhim M.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Subject: Environmental services industry
ISSN: 0095-0696
Year: 2005
United States, Science & research, Taxation

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Neoclassical growth, the J curve for abatement, and the inverted U curve for pollution

Article Abstract:

B.A. Forster's neoclassical environmental growth model is analyzed to understand the dynamic relationships involving pollution, abatement effort, and economic development. The model, which has previously been used in the analysis of steady-state levels of capital, consumption, and environmental quality, offers a theoretical foundation for recent empirical research on J curves for abatement effort and inverted U curves for pollution.

Author: Selden, Thomas M., Song, Daqing
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Subject: Environmental services industry
ISSN: 0095-0696
Year: 1995
Environmental economics

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Risk sharing in Cosean contracts

Article Abstract:

Under the Coasean contracts pollution levels allowed depend on the agents risk appetites and on the initial configuration of property rights and bargaining power. The emissions create a financial risk when pollution damages are Stochastic.

Author: Zivin, Joshua Graff, Small, Arthur A.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Subject: Environmental services industry
ISSN: 0095-0696
Year: 2003
Coase theorem

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Subjects list: Research, Economic aspects, Pollution
Similar abstracts:
  • Abstracts: International fish wars: the strategic roles for fleet licensing and effort subsidies. The compleat fish wars: biological and dynamic interactions
  • Abstracts: A derivation of the marginal abatement cost curve. Stochastic pollution, permits, and merger incentives. Small pollution markets: tradable permits versus revelation mechanisms
  • Abstracts: Desalination of seawater. Water utility mixes technology and creativity for control and communications solution
  • Abstracts: Degradation of explosive propellants by in-vessel composting. Broadening compost use in Southern Europe
  • Abstracts: Continued growth for variable rates. Texas moves into variable rates. Variable rate initiatives at the state level
This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.
Some parts © 2025 Advameg, Inc.