Myopic corporate behaviour with optimal management incentives

Article Abstract:

Shareholders choose an incentive contract that promotes a bias towards short-term returns when managers trade their own account on the stock market that is observable to market participants but not verifiable in court. The short-term bias is greater when the optimal contract supports low-powered management incentives. Moreover, managers favor short-term stock prices and exhibit myopic behavior when the ratio of short-term to long-term stock price volatility is smaller.

Securities and Commodity Exchanges, Security and commodity exchanges, Securities Exchanges, Open-End Investment Funds, Investment Funds & Trusts, HOLDING AND OTHER INVESTMENT OFFICES, Analysis, Stocks, Stock-exchange, Stock exchanges, Exchanges, Investments

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Paying for loyalty: product bundling in oligopoly

Article Abstract:

The benefits of offering of huge discounts by retail chains for loyal customers in multiple market places are examined and proved.

Retail Trade, Retail industry, Marketing, Company marketing practices, Discounts (Sales), Loyalty programs (Marketing)

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Relationships, competition and the structure of investment banking markets

Article Abstract:

The impact of competitions on relationship management of investment banks and market structure is evaluated.

Investment Banking and Securities Dealing, Investment Banking, Security brokers and dealers, Market Targeting & Approach, Competition (Economics), Investment banks, Market strategy

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