Econometrica 1999 - Abstracts

Econometrica 1999
TitleSubjectAuthors
A characterization of interim efficiency with public goods.MathematicsPalfrey, Thomas R., Ledyard, John O.
A liquidity-based model of security design.MathematicsDuffie, Darrel, DeMarzo, Peter
A root-n consistent semiparametric estimator for related-effect binary response panel data.MathematicsLee, Myoung-Jae
Bayesian representation of stochastic processes under learning: De Finetti revisited.MathematicsSmorodinsky, Rann, Jackson, Matthew O., Kalai, Ehud
Choice without beliefs.(axiomatic foundation for decision making in a complex environment)MathematicsEasley, David, Rustichini, Aldo
Clubs and the market.(a general equilibrium model with exchange and club formation)MathematicsEllickson, Bryan, Grodal, Birgit, Scotchmer, Suzanne, Zame, William R.
Common value auctions with insider information.MathematicsLevin, Dan, Kagel, John Henry
Consistent moment selection procedures for generalized method of moments estimation.MathematicsAndrews, Donald W.K.
Conventional confidence intervals for points on spectrum have confidence level zero.MathematicsFaust, Jon
Cooperation in repeated games when the number of stages is not commonly known.MathematicsNeyman, Abraham
Efficiency and equilibrium with dynamic increasing aggregate returns due to demand complementarities.MathematicsMatsuyama, Kiminori, Ciccone, Antonio
Efficiency and immediate agreement: a reply to Hart and Levy.(response to article in this issue, p. 909)MathematicsGul, Faruk
Efficiency does not imply immediate agreement.MathematicsHart, Sergiu, Levy, Zohar
Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, and common knowledge of rationality.MathematicsPolak, Ben
Error brands for impulse responses.MathematicsSims, Christopher A., Zha, Tao
Estimation of regression coefficients of interest when other regression coefficients are of no interest.MathematicsMagnus, Jan R., Durbin, J.
Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games.MathematicsCamerer, Colin, Ho, Teck-Hua
Explaining investment dynamics in U.S. manufacturing: a generalized (S,s) approach.MathematicsCaballero, Ricardo J., Engel, Eduardo M.R.
Growing through cycles.MathematicsMatsuyama, Kiminori
High wage workers and high wage firms.MathematicsKramarz, Francis, Abowd, John M., Margolis, David N.
Household gasoline demand in the United States.MathematicsSchmalensee, Richard, Stoker, Thomas M.
Incomplete contracts: where do we stand?MathematicsTirole, Jean
Linear regression limit theory for nonstationary panel data.MathematicsPhillips, Peter C.B., Moon, Hyungsik R.
Lorenz dominance and the variance of logarithms.MathematicsOk, Efe A., Foster, James E.
Nonparametric estimation of triangular simultaneous equations models.MathematicsPowell, James L., Newey, Whitney K., Vella, Francis
On the convergence to homogeneous expectations when markets are complete.MathematicsSandroni, Alvaro, Araujo, Aloisio
On the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous games.MathematicsReny, Philip J.
On the failure of the linkage principle in multi-unit auctions.MathematicsReny, Philip J., Perry, Motty
Power of tests in binary response models.MathematicsSavin, N.E., Wurtz, A.H.
Power of tests in binary response models: comment.(response to an article by N.E. Savin and A.H. Wurtz, in this issue, p. 413)MathematicsGeweke, John
Preference for flexibility in a savage framework.MathematicsNehring, Klaus
Rationalizing policy functions by dynamic optimization.MathematicsMitra, Tapan, Sorger, Gerhard
Relative utilitarianism.MathematicsDhillon, Amrita, Mertens, Jean-Francois
Repeated games with differential time preferences.MathematicsLehrer, Ehud, Pauzner, Ady
Semiparametric estimation of a proportional hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity.MathematicsHorowitz, Joel L.
Separable preferences, strategyproofness, and decomposability.MathematicsBreton, Michel Le, Sen, Arunava
Social security and demographic shocks.MathematicsLaroque, Guy, Demange, Gabrielle
Strategic experimentation.MathematicsBolton, Patrick, Harris, Christopher
Strategy-proof and symmetric social choice functions for public good economies.MathematicsSerizawa, Shigehiro
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores.MathematicsSonmez, Tayfun
The democratic political economy of progressive income taxation.MathematicsRoemer, John E.
The influence of VAR dimensions on estimator biases.(vector autoregression)MathematicsAbadir, Karim M., Hadri, Kaddour, Tzavalis, Elias
The measurement of unemployment: an empirical approach.MathematicsRiddell, W. Craig, Jones, Stephen R.G.
The Nash solutino and the utility of bargaining: a corrigendum.MathematicsGerber, Anke
Truncation strategies in matching markets - in search of advice for participants.MathematicsRoth, Alvin E., Rothblum, Uriel G.
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